Assimetria informacional e a política de dividendos das empresas listadas na B3: uma análise geral e estratificada por setor

Abstract

The present study analyzes the impact of information asymmetry on the dividend policy of companies listed on B3 (Brazil Stock Exchange), investigating this relationship from both a general and a sectoral perspective. The research problem examines whether information asymmetry between managers and investors affects the dividend policy decisions in the Brazilian market, based on Agency, Signaling, and Pecking Order theories. To achieve the objectives, the t-Tobit model was used as the methodology, given its suitability for dealing with the censorship of the dependent variable and the presence of extreme values in the sample. The results of the general analysis confirm that information asymmetry impacts dividend policy, evidencing that the reduction of uncertainty, measured by the ask-bid spread, tends to increase the payment of proceeds. The sectoral analysis, the main contribution of this work, revealed that the impact of the determinants varies substantially according to the operational characteristics of each segment. In regulated sectors, such as Public Utilities, expected growth had a positive effect, reinforcing the role of dividends as stability signals, while in the NonCyclical Consumption sector, the policy demonstrated greater rigidity, being mainly influenced by the control structure. In capital-intensive sectors, such as Industrial Goods and Cyclical Consumption, the Pecking Order logic and the dependence on free cash flow prevailed, with information asymmetry acting as a restrictive factor. In contrast, in the Materials and Oil and Gas sectors, dividends are used to signal favorable perspectives even under volatility. In the Health sector, agency conflicts associated with insider ownership proved to be predominant, while in the Financial sector, regulation and exposure to international markets via ADRs (American Depositary Receipts) prevailed. The study concludes that transparency and adherence to differentiated governance segments are effective in allowing more consistent distribution policies, especially in higher-risk sectors. For regulators and investors, the findings highlight that the effectiveness of signaling and monitoring mechanisms depends on the specificities of each economic sector.